As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, the district court in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir., July 10, 2014), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Sept. 18, 2014), pet. for cert. filed, LVNV Funding, LLC, v. Crawford, Case No. 14-858 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 15, 2015),  held that the Bankruptcy Code does not preempt a debtor’s claims for a creditor’s alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by conduct that occurs while the debtor’s bankruptcy case is ongoing, even where, as here, the debtor has also filed an adversary proceeding against the creditor in the bankruptcy court to recover for the creditor’s violation of the automatic stay. See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[w]hen, as…

Yes. As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, the Debtor’s bad faith is cause for dismissal of Chapter 7 case under Code § 707(a). The debtor exhibited bad faith in filing her Chapter 7 case, warranting the dismissal of the case for cause under Code § 707(a), where (1) there were deficiencies in the debtor’s initial schedules, in that a significant amount of debt was missing, with the debtor’s amended schedules showing a dramatic increase of unsecured debt from $267,006 to $1,132,497 and the addition of the now-largest creditors; (2) while the debtor now claimed that she did not review the original schedules filed in her case, she stated otherwise at the meeting of creditors, so that either she did in fact approve her initial schedules,…

No. As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, the evidentiary presumption of the validity of a claim that arises upon the proper filing of a proof of claim does not extend to the priority status of the claim.  In re Hack, 2009 WL 1392068 (Bankr. C.D. Ill., May 14, 2009); In re Taranovich, 1994 WL 329429 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994); In re Central Rubber Products, Inc., 31 B.R. 865 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983). Contra, In re Uzaldin, 418 B.R. 166 (Bankr. E.D. Va., August 7, 2009); In re DeAngelis Tangibles, Inc., 238 B.R. 96 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1999); In re Transouth Truck Equip., Inc., 87 B.R. 937, 940 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988). In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704 (Bankr. C.D. Ill., Oct. 30, 2014) (case no. 3:14-bk-70578) (Chief Bankruptcy Judge…

Yes. As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, disagreeing with both In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that the nonrefundable general child tax credit is not exempt as a “public assistance benefit” under 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12–1001(g)(1), while the refundable additional child tax credit is exempt) and In re Hardy, 503 B.R. 722 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2013) (holding that the refundable additional child tax credit is not an exempt “public assistance benefit” under Missouri law), the bankruptcy court held that both the refundable and the nonrefundable portions of the debtor’s federal child tax credit were exempt under 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12–1001(g)(1) as a “public assistance benefit.” Declaring that the discussion of debtors’ relative affluence inKoch and Hardy as determinative of whether an exemption…

No. As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, the Chapter 7 debtor could avoid, under Code § 522(f), a creditor’s judgment lien on homestead property owned by the debtor and his nondebtor wife as tenants by the entirety, insofar as the lien attached to the debtor’s interest in the property as a tenant by the entirety, since under Illinois law the creditor, whose judgment was against the debtor only, could not proceed against the property, so that the debtor’s interest as a tenant by the entirety was exempt under Code § 522(b)(2)(B). However, Illinois law did not provide any exemption for the debtor’s contingent future interests in the property should the spouses divorce or the wife die, so that the debtor could not avoid the…

Yes. As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, following the confirmation of the Chapter 13 debtor’s plan, the property of the estate revested in the debtor. Accordingly, the court could not grant the debtor’s motion, following the confirmation of his plan, to sell certain real property free and clear of liens under Code § 363(f), since the statute permits only the sale of property of the estate. In re Altmeyer, 2014 WL 4959146 (Bankr. S.D. Ill., Oct. 2, 2014) (case no. 6:10-bk-60275) (Bankruptcy Judge Kenneth J. Meyers)

As reported by Robin Miller of CBAR, any increase in the cash surrender value of the Chapter 13 debtor’s life insurance policy was neither income nor projected disposable income. Courts have repeatedly held that “[o]nly regular income and substitutes therefor can be counted in the determination of disposable income for the purposes of the chapter 13 test.” See In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). In re Brown, 2014 WL 4793243 (Bankr. E.D. Wis., Sept. 24, 2014) (case no. 2:13-bk-35593) (Bankruptcy Judge G. Michael Halfenger)